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Abstract 
Like active labour market programmes (ALPMs), grade repetition could generate two types of 
effects. Better/worse outcomes due to programme participation (i.e. the fact that pupils repeat a 
particular grade). This is what the existing literature on grade repetition has focused on. Another 
potential outcome is the ‘threat’ effect of grade repetition. Pupils and/or their family could make 
significant efforts to avoid grade repetition and its important opportunity cost. Learning effort by 
pupils could be a function of the risk of grade repetition. This paper attempts to assess that 
relationship by exploiting a reform introduced in 2001 in the French-Speaking Community of 
Belgium, synonymous with a reinforced overall threat of grade repetition. The possibility to impose 
grade repetition sanctions and the end of grade 8-12 has always existed, but in year 2001, policy 
makers reinstated the possibility to repeat grade  7, putting an end to the regime of “social 
promotion” applicable to that grade since 1995. We use data from two waves of the PISA study 
(corresponding to periods before and after the reform) to evaluate the medium-term effects of this 
reform. The first measure of performance we consider is the position in the curriculum (or grade) 
reached at the age of 15, and we show that it deteriorated after 2001. We also consider the reform’s 
impact on test scores. Focusing on grade 10, we fail to verify the necessary condition for grade 
repetition threat to lead to higher test scores. The tentative conclusion is that an enhanced threat of 
grade retention after 2001 did not lead to better medium-term outcomes, even among the segments 
of the population the most at risk of grade repetition. 
 
JEL: I20, I28, H52 
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Grade repetition (or retention) is a contentious issue. Some countries privilege a system of “social 
promotion”, which allows pupils to be promoted to higher grades independently of their 
performance, while other countries have instituted more or less strict policies of grade retention, 
conditioning promotion to higher grades on educational achievements.  As a consequence, there is a 
considerable variation in grade retention rates across OECD countries (Figure 1). Countries/entities 
like the Netherlands (NLD), Austria (AUT), Portugal (PRT) and the French-Speaking Community 
of Belgium (BFR) have relatively high rates of grade retention (going up to 50% of pupils having 
repeated a year or more by the time they reach the end of compulsory schooling) ; while countries 
like Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), Japan (JPN) and Great Britain (GBR) have no grade retention 
at all.  
 
Figure 1 – Average score in math and share of pupils aged 15 attending reference grade
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a: Grade 10 in most countries, grade 9 otherwise. The grade of reference is identified as the most attended grade among 
15 year-olds who participated to PISA. 
ARG: Argentina ; AUS: Australia ; AUT: Austria ; AZE: Azerbaijan ; BFR: French-Speaking Community of Belgium; 
BFL: Flemish-Speaking Community of Belgium; BGR: Bulgaria ; BRA: Brazil; CAN: Canada; CHE: Switzerland; 
CHL: Chile COL: Colombia CZE: Czech Republic; DEU: Germany; DNK: Denmark; ESP: Spain EST: Estonia; FIN: 
Finland; FRA: France; GBR: United Kingdom; GRC: Greece; HKG: Hong Kong-China; HRV: Croatia; HUN: 
Hungary; IDN: Indonesia IRL: Ireland; ISL: Iceland; ISR: Israel; ITA: Italy JOR: Jordan; JPN: Japan KGZ: 
Kyrgyzstan; KOR: Korea LIE: Liechtenstein LTU: Lithuania LUX: Luxembourg; LVA: Latvia; MAC: Macao-China; 
MEX: Mexico; MNE: Montenegro; NLD: Netherlands; NOR: Norway; NZL: New Zealand; POL: Poland; PRT: 
Portugal QAT: Qatar; ROU: Romania; RUS: Russian Federation; SRB: Serbia; SVK: Slovak Republic; SVN: Slovenia 
SWE: Sweden; TAP: Chinese Taipei; THA: Thailand TUN: Tunisia; TUR: Turkey; URY: Uruguay; USA: United 
States. 
Source: PISA 2006 
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Analysts disagree as to which policy is the most effective. The point we raise in this paper is that 
this debate about the pros and cons of grade repetition would gain some insights by considering 
recent developments of the evaluation literature on Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). These 
are government programmes aimed at helping the unemployed find work. Many of them consists of 
imposing that benefit recipients with poor (re)employment prospects participate to training 
schemes, such as classes and apprenticeships. ALMPs are motivated by a need to upgrade the skills 
of unemployed individuals in order to increase their employability.  
 
We argue here that grade repetition bears a strong likeness to ALMPs. First, grade repetition is 
motivated by the need to upgrade the (basic) skills of less able individuals (i.e. pupils) in order to 
increase their future prospects (i.e. their chance to grasp the more advanced curriculum taught in 
higher grades). The advocates of grade repetition insist on giving weak students another opportunity 
to acquire the necessary skills before being passed on to a level for which they would not otherwise 
be prepared. Second — and more importantly in the context of this paper — the evaluation 
literature on ALMPs has established a distinction between i) the treatment or ex post effects of 
programme participation, and ii) the ‘threat’ or ex ante motivational effects of programmes. 
Whereas the existing literature on grade repetition has largely covered the first aspect, it has, so far, 
largely neglected the threat effects of grade repetition. This paper intends to fill that void. It 
evaluates these threat effects by exploiting a reform introduced in 2001 in the French-Speaking 
Community of Belgium. That reform resulted into an enhanced overall threat of grade repetition. 
Although the possibility to impose grade repetition in grade 8-12 always existed; the year 2001 
brought a significant regime change as policy makers reinstated the possibility to repeat grade 7 (1st 




The main results of the paper are that an enhanced threat of grade retention after 2001 did not lead 
to better outcomes, even among the pupils the most at risk of grade repetition (the “borderline” 
students hereafter). The first measure of educational performance we consider is the position in the 
curriculum (or grade). We show that the typical grade attained at age 15 has decreased with the re-
introduction of grade retention sanctions at the end of grade 7. The overall proportion of pupils who 
made it into grade 10 at the age of 15 (i.e. those with a no-grade-repetition record) fell by about 4 
percentage points. The corresponding fall among borderline pupils (e.g. those with low-educated 
mothers or from low socio-economic background a priori more exposed to the risk of grade 
repetition) is estimated to be in the range of 10-14 percentage points. These results may seem 
trivial. However, we think they are probably not a mechanical implication of the reform, because 
the threat/incentive argument predicts an improvement of performance. The reform should have 
increased the proportion of pupils making it to grade 10 without grade repetition.  The most fervent 
proponents of grade repetition think indeed that grade repetition sanctions bear some likeness to 
Cold-War arsenal: their sole existence suffices to significantly alter human behavior. This paper 
contains evidence that they may be overoptimistic in that respect. 
 
We consider a second, a priori more natural, measure of outcome: test scores. These are reflecting 
the actual cognitive skills attained by pupils at a certain grade. And we focus on those of the pupils 
with no grade-repetition record, thus attending grade 10 at the age of 15. We have stated above that 
the 2001 reform reduced the proportion of those pupils, presumably by sorting out the less-able 
ones. The change of grade 10 average score is thus likely to reflect a (presumably positive) screen 
out effect. But it should also reflect the threat effects we are interested in, singularly among the 
borderline students forming the lower end of the grade 10 test score distribution. Both effects 
should a priori reinforce each other and lead to an improvement in the average grade 10 test scores. 
But our results point at the absence of statistically significant improvement. We then conclude that 
there has been no medium- to long-term benefit to enhanced grade repetition threat. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 develops the comparison between 
grade repetition and ALMPs and the way these policies have been evaluated in the literature. 
Section 3 presents the 2001 reform in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium and documents 
its interest as a source of exogenous variation of the threat of grade repetition. Section 4 presents the 
results of the empirical analysis of threat effects. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Participation vs. threat effect 
 
“Is the threat of reemployment services more effective than the services themselves?”. This is the 
question asked by Black et al. (2003) in their seminal paper. It epitomizes the distinction now 
commonly made by labour economists and employment-policy evaluators between the benefits 
people derive from programme participation (e.g. a training programme for the long-term 
unemployed) and the way they respond ex ante to the cost or discomfort associated to mandatory 
participation: something known in that literature as the “threat” effect of the programme.  
 
Threat effects are probably driven by the opportunity costs associated to programme participation 
(less leisure, locking-in problems…). These seem to suffice to entice unemployed individuals to 
raise their search effort prior to participation and rapidly move out of unemployment (Rosholm & 
Svarer, 2004; Cockx & Dejemeppe, 2007; Rosholm and Svarer, 2008). We argue here that pupils 
(and/or their family) could also raise their efforts and study harder to avoid the opportunity cost of 
grade repetition that is a priori high. A grade repetition sanction means indeed that a whole extra 
year is required to preserve the possibility to obtain a certain diploma. 
 
There is now ample evidence that the participation to ALMPs have small, and in some cases even 
adverse, effects in terms of increasing job-finding rates for the long-term unemployed; see e.g. 
Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999). By contrast, the ALPMs evaluation literature produces robust 
evidence of positive threat effects. Black et al. (2003) conclude that threat is the main gain of a 
training programme imposed to American unemployed with the lowest reemployment prospects. 
Other researchers have shown that the prospect of mandatory participation to ALMPs (sometimes 
just receiving a letter of notification) impacts the unemployment exit rate as much as programme 
participation (Rosholm and Svarer, 2004; Geerdsen, 2006; Geerdsen and Holm, 2007). 
 
So far, the education literature has exclusively focused on the participation (or ex post) effect of 
grade retention, namely its consequences on final attainment. Holmes (1989), in a large meta-
analysis, finds that, on average, later test scores of children retained are 0.19 to 0.31 standard 
deviations lower than those of similar children progressing normally through school. The same 
negative results are reported in a subsequent meta-analysis by Jimerson (2001). Belgian evidence on 
this is surprisingly limited. The only published study we came across is the one by Goos, Van 
Damme, Onghena & Petry (2010). This said, it also finds first-grade repeaters would have 6 
 
performed better and would have shown a similar or even better outcome  had they been promoted 
to second grade.  
 
There is also a large amount of evidence of a negative relationship between retention (i.e. 
participation) and high school dropout (e.g., Grissom and Shepard, 1989; Roderick, 1994; Jimerson, 
1999).  
 
Part of that literature tries to address the endogeneity of grade retention by providing quasi-
experimental evidence of the effects of grade retention.  Eide and Showalter (2001) use the 
variation in the age of entry into kindergarten across US states as an instrument for grade retention. 
They find that for white students, grade retention may have some benefit by both lowering dropout 
rates and raising labour market earnings, although their IV estimates tend to be statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Three studies (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004, 2009; Roderick and Nagaoka, 
2005) exploit a discontinuity in the retention decision under Chicago’s high-stakes testing policy 
introduced in 1996-97. The policy created a discontinuity in the relation between scores in a single 
standardised test (thereby the label “high stakes”) and the probability of grade retention. Using a 
regression discontinuity design, these studies evaluate the ex post effects of grade retention on pupil 
performance at different points in time. Jacob and Lefgren (2004) find no systematic differences in 
performance between retained and promoted students in the short-run. Roderick and Nagaoka 
(2005) show that third-grade students who were retained do not yield higher language test scores 
two years after the retention, and that retained sixth graders had lower achievement growth. Finally, 
Jacob and Lefgren (2009) find that grade retention leads to a modest increase in the probability of 
dropping out for older students, but has no significant effect on younger students. Manacorda 
(2010) exploiting the discontinuity induced by a rule establishing automatic grade repetition for  
Uruguayan pupils with  more than three failed subjects, shows that grade repetition leads to 
substantial drop-out and lower educational attainment even four to five years after repetition first 
occurred. 
 
In short, these studies nicely evaluate the causal effects of being retained. Like many ALMPs 
evaluation studies they seem to produce mixed evidence about the ex post benefits of grade 
retention (those stemming from participation). However, these studies do not evaluate the possible 
threat (or motivational) effects of a grade retention policy. The work by Jacobs (2005) is a 
noteworthy exception. It is the most closely related paper to ours, as it almost exclusively focuses 7 
 
on what its author calls the “incentive” effect of retention.
 2  Using before-and-after mathematics 
and reading test score of pupils affected by the above-mentioned 3
rd, 6
th and 8
th grade Chicago high-
stake testing policy
3, he documents some evidence of motivational effects of such a policy, mainly 
for 8
th graders. He finds little evidence of benefits that can be ascribed to student-oriented 
incentives across grades 3-7.  
 
Although it would be hard from a policy-making perspective to justify a policy of grade retention 
solely because of positive threat effects, rather than because it is directly beneficial to those who are 
retained, we believe is worthwhile investigating whether there is any evidence of positive 
threat/motivational effects in the first place.   
 
3. Exploiting the French-Speaking Community reform to assess the 
threat/motivational effects of grade retention 
 
Grade retention has existed for a long time in Belgian secondary schools and has been extensively 
used to sanction students with weak results at the end of all grades (7 to 12). It is particularly 
frequent in the French-Speaking Community
4 (Figure 1). The retention decision in French-Speaking 
schools is based on the teachers’ assessment of the pupil’s ability of passing to a higher grade. 
There is no standardised test used across schools, nor is there a clearly defined threshold to 
determine whether a pupil should be retained or not. All pupils do take exams at the end of the 
school year, for each subject and the retention decision is made after these exams have been taken.  
 
Opponents to grade retention succeeded in 1995 in almost eliminating grade repetition at the end of 
grade 7  (1
st year of secondary education). However, the possibility to impose grade repetition 
sanctions and the end of grades 8-12 remained unaltered.  The argument for suppressing grade 
retention at the end of grade 7 at the time was that the entrance into secondary education involves a 
                                                 
2   As opposed to what he calls the “sanction” effect (i.e higher achievement that could be ascribed to grade 
repetition and the additional time granted to students to master the lower grade curriculum, before moving on) 
3   Students who do not meet the standard are required to attend a 6-week summer school programme, after which 
they retake the exams. Those who pass move on to the next grade; those who fail this second exam are required to 
repeat the grade (Jacob, 2005). 
4   Belgium is a federal state where the educational policy is split according to linguistic lines. Each linguistic 
community is in charge of its educational system. Only minor aspects of the educational policy (like the age of 
compulsory education i.e. 18) remain under federal jurisdiction. 8 
 
sharp change in the schooling environment – moving from one teacher to a range of teachers – and 
that pupils may need time to adjust to this new environment. From 1995 to 2001, the main rule was 
no grade retention was allowed at the end of grade 7, a decision that translated into a sharp fall of 
the share of “repeaters” (Figure 2). Pupils could only possibly repeat grade 7 upon agreement 
between parents and teachers. This is why on Figure 2 one observes a persistence of grade retention 
at the end of grade 7 during the 1995-2001 period. 
 
The proponents of grade retention made a successful comeback six years later. In September 2001, 
the decision was made
5 to re-establish the possibility of retaining pupils at the end of grade 7.  In a 
few words, the 2001 reform was such that after the school year 2001-02 it became possible to repeat 
grade 7 or grade 8, although not both.
6  The arguments in favour of grade repetition were essentially 
twofold. First, it could be that it is better to retain pupils earlier rather than later. Second, the re-
introduction of a threat of retention in grade 7 could provide incentives for weaker pupils to put in 
more effort, something that would make sense in a context where pupils value the costs of repeating 
in the near future heavier than the costs of repeating later. It is important to stress that the post-2001 
regime kept the incentives to perform in grade 8 and beyond as high as before the reform; those 
who passed grade 7 were exposed to the threat of having to repeat subsequent grades in the same 
way they were under the system with no retention in grade 7.  The main difference is that the reform 
introduced an additional evaluation and retention decision, a priori reinforcing the overall threat of 
grade repetition.  
 
                                                 
5   Décret relatif à l'organisation du premier degré de l'enseignement secondaire  D. 19-07-2001  M.B. 23-08-
2001 
6   Formally, the legislator insists on the fact that the reform’s aim was not exactly to force the pupils to “repeat” 
the year, but to channel weaker students (who do not achieve satisfactory results at the end of grade 7 or at the end of 
grade 8) towards a “complementary” year. In practice, however, it amounts to imposing that these students take more 
time before moving to the upper grade. 9 
 




















































Source: French-Speaking Community of Belgium, Ministry of Education. 
 
In truth, the reform did not represent a switch in one go from one extreme (no retention at any stage 
of the curriculum) to the other extreme (grade retention at all grades of the curriculum). However, 
the 2001 reform concerned one of the most important moments of a pupil’s career. The marginal 
return to study effort during grade 7 could be higher than during, say, grade 10 or 11.  We also think 
that the most relevant evaluation works are those considering reforms that introduce changes at the 
margin, as most of the time policy-making consists of timid and relatively marginal moves.  
 
Administrative data (Figure 2) show that the share of pupils repeating grade 7 rose from the school 
year 2002-03 onwards.  Quite strikingly, the same data also show that the share of students 
repeating grade 7 or grade 8 is substantially higher in 2002-03 and beyond, meaning that the 2001 
reform actually increased the (short-term) risk of grade retention, but also suggesting that it failed to 
entice pupils to work harder to avoid that sanction and its large opportunity cost. 
 
At this stage of the paper the main message is that the 2001 reform enables us to evaluate the effect 
of an additional intermediary retention sanction. Before 2001, the decision to retain pupils was 
delayed until grade 8. After 2001, pupils could already be retained at the end of grade 7. Hereafter, 
we exploit data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA): the OECD’s 
international standardised assessment administered to 15-year-olds students. This allow us to 
investigate more carefully the medium- to long-term
7 (causal) threat effects of the 2001 reform on i) 
grade attainment and ii) standardized test scores.  
                                                 
7   Remember that we look at age 15 scores to identify the effect of a decision that affected pupils when they were 
aged 12-13. 10 
 
 
Note already that PISA only contain same-age test scores (all respondents are aged 15) meaning 
that we are not able to evaluate the (ex post) participation effects of grade repetition. Only an 
evaluation of test scores at equal level of curriculum (same-grade test scores of repeaters vs. non- 
repeaters) would be informative about whether repletion is beneficial or not. Since in PISA there are 
differences in positions in the curriculum, the comparison of test scores between retained and non-
retained pupils is not directly meaningful.  By contrast, PISA test scores are perfectly suitable to 
assess the threat effects of grade repetition. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Data, identification strategy and control group 
 
In each country that participated to PISA, standardised tests in Maths, Science and Reading literacy 
were administered to representative samples of pupils (we also run our analysis using the average 
score obtained by a respondent for each these three topics). We have information from the PISA 
study (before the reform (PISA 2003) and after the reform (PISA 2006), measuring, at the age of 
15, grade attainment and cognitive performance in a standardised test across OECD countries in 
Maths, Reading and Science. In addition, the PISA assessment contains many questions about 
attended grade and programme student background or school characteristics. 
 
We use two waves of the PISA study (2003 and 2006). The 2003 wave includes pupils who 
experienced the social promotion regime during their first year of secondary education (no risk of 
retention in grade 7) and the 2006 wave includes pupils who were affected by the reform (risk of 
grade repetition).
8 Since we are looking at 15-year olds, the grade reference for these pupils is grade 
10 (grade they would have attained without retention).  
 
The identification of a causal effect of enhanced grade retention threats faces challenges. First, due 
to data constraints, we primarily use grade 10 test scores to detect an increase of effort that may 
have occurred during grade 7. There is no doubt that we are using students who have only been 
exposed to (varying degrees of) the “threat” of grade repetition. By construction, their presence in 
                                                 
8   We have chosen not to use the 2000 wave because the sample size for the French Community of Belgium was 
about half the size in comparison to 2003 and 2006. This may raise issues of comparability across cohorts. 11 
 
grade 10 at the age of 15 means they never repeated a grade. Our empirical configuration is thus 
ideal to separate threat from treatment effects. One may, however, argue
9 that the ideal regression to 
assess the benefits of enhanced threat would be to use test scores at the end of grade 7, before the 
grade retention decision is stated. But the acquisition of cognitive skills is very cumulative; and 
unless incentives to study in grade 8-10 were altered after the 2001 reform, one would still expect 
medium-term (ie. grade 10) outcomes to reflect additional efforts made quite earlier. Second, 
resorting to between-country variance (Figure 1) is insufficient to properly identify the causal threat 
effect on scores of the grade repetition. Cross-country difference in terms of grade repetition 
incidence could be correlated with unobserved socio-economic or policy differences that also affect 
PISA scores . Third, changes observed within a country after a grade-repetition regime change may 
be driven by unobserved confounding factors that are correlated with scores, like a better/worse 
economic environment (insufficiently or inadequately captured by the observables available in 
PISA). Thus, ideally the identification of the effects of grade retention requires not only an 
exogenous change in the threat of grade repetition, but also the existence of a counterfactual to 
account for time-related changes. This is why we resort to a difference-in-difference (DD) analysis 
comparing the changes observed in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium to the changes 
observed in a control group. This approach also ensures that any systematic differences in the 
difficulty of the tests between the different years are netted out. 
 
Of course, the challenge is to find an adequate control group. There is no ideal counterfactual 
country. We have experimented with different combinations of countries
10 and chose countries that 
satisfy the following criteria
11 i) located in Europe ii) where grade retention does not exist. This 
group comprises Great-Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Sweden.  
 
Why Europe? Because the “parallel-trend” assumption is a critical assumption in a DD framework. 
And non-European OECD countries could be affected by overall trends that are not similar to those 
affecting Europe. The US, Australia and New-Zealand or Canada for instance are known for being 
relatively disconnected from Europe in terms of business cycle.   
 
                                                 
9   Following what is usually done in the empirical labour literature on the threat benefits of ALMPs. 
10   We essentially tried alternatives using the Flemish-Community of Belgium and the immediate EU neighbours 
of Belgium (France, Germany, the Netherlands). But the choice of countries forming the control group did not 
fundamentally affect our results. 
11   We aggregate these different countries, weighing each of them by the inverse of its PISA sample size. More 
details on this in the next section. 12 
 
Why countries with no grade repetition policy? DD requires that nothing else that the intensity of 
grade repetition threat changes between the two groups between 2003 and 2006. We argue that, by 
definition, the countries forming our control group were unlikely to experience simultaneous 
changes in their grade assignment regime. By contrast, those with a grade repetition policy could 
have experienced changes of their own in the incidence of grade retention. There is indeed some 
evidence that many European countries are gradually limiting the possibility to impose grade 
repetition sanctions and try to promote the use of alternative « remedial » strategies.  
 
But other sources of asymmetrical changes could exist. Educational policy comprises many more 
dimensions than the grade repetition regime, and these may have evolved asymmetrically, 
impacting country-specific test score trajectories. There is, however, little evidence suggesting that 
this was the case, at least at the very aggregate level. The third column of Table 1 for instance 
suggests that overall test scores
12 gaps remained within the range of 2 to 3 points (unchanged in 
essence).  The next two columns of Table 1 also show that school resources (student/teacher, 
computer/student ratio or share of certified teachers) did not evolve asymmetrically. Socioeconomic 
characteristics influencing PISA scores could also have diverged between 2003 and 2006. For 
instance, the shares of students with low-educated mother may have evolved in a diverging manner. 
Yet, Table 1 descriptive statistics on key aspects of pupils’ socioeconomic background do not 
support this. In any case, we are able to account for socioeconomic changes by adding control 
variables in our DD model (see Section 4.3. for more details).  Finally, the use of a synthetic control 
group (i.e. formed by the aggregation of the European countries listed above) a priori reinforces the 
plausibility that nothing else that the intensity of grade repetition threat has changed across the 
entities. There is indeed a reasonable chance that many of the confounding changes that exist in a 
one-to-one framework (i.e. based on the comparison of the French-Speaking Belgium with just one 
other country) simply cancel out in the one-to-many setting used here. 
 
                                                 
12   Scores reported in Table 1 and in subsequent econometric analysis correspond to individual averages, 
aggregating scores obtained in the three topics covered by PISA: math, sciences and reading literacy. 13 
 
Table 1. French-Speaking Belgium vs. European controls. Descriptive statistics before (2003) and 
after (2006) natural experiment 





















2003 39228 496.68 11.43 0.20 0.94 49.58 3.39 3.34
2006 45571 496.13 11.80 0.19 0.94 49.95 3.54 3.47
2003 3737 494.72 10.14 0.09 0.86 50.56 3.72 3.70
2006 3733 493.40 9.90 0.11 0.78 50.62 3.64 3.66
Control (i.e. weighted average of  Great-
Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Iceland, Norway,  Poland and Sweden)
French-Speaking Belgium
 
All observations  forming the control entity are weighted by the (inverted) country-specific PISA sample size. This is a 
way to reduce the risk that big countries — which sampled more pupils to achieve national representativeness — dwarf 
smaller ones. 
a: Based on student average test score in math, sciences and reading. 
b: ISCED scale: level 0 – Pre-primary education, level 1 – Primary education or first stage of basic education, level 2 – 
Lower secondary or second stage of basic education. level 3 – (Upper) secondary education, level 4 – Post-secondary 
non-tertiary education, level 5 – First stage of tertiary education, level 6 – Second stage of tertiary education. 
Source: PISA 2003, 2006 
 
In short, our study presents four main advantages. First, it examines the threat effects of grade 
retention; something that has received too little attention so far in the literature, although the 
threat/incentive argument lies at the core of many discussions and policy debates surrounding grade 
repetition. Second the reintroduction of grade retention in 2001 provides a natural experiment to 
evaluate the effects of grade retention threat. Of course the Belgian reform only reintroduces grade 
retention at the end of grade 7 (it has always been possible to impose grade repetition sanctions 
from grade 8 and beyond), so it is not clear that the overall incentives to study have been greatly 
affected. On the other hand, grade-repetition-as-a-threat a priori affects more students than grade-
repetition-as-a-treatment. A small doze of uncertainty in the relationship between effort, ability, 
exam scores and actual grade repetition sanctions (combined with some risk aversion among pupils 
and their family) imply that the benefits of threat should be observed among a relatively large and 
diversified (in terms of socio-economic background) group of pupils. Only those at the extreme 
ends of the ability distribution (those who are certain to fail or pass) should not respond to an 
enhanced threat of grade repetition.  Third, since schooling is compulsory until the age of 18 in 
Belgium, there is no possible drop-out yet. This facilitates the comparison of scores pre and post-
reform. Fourth, our PISA data provide a control group suitable for carrying out at difference-in-
differences (DD) analysis, namely the European countries that do not have a grade repetition policy.  
 
Our first measure of educational performance is the position in the curriculum (or grade). We show 
that the typical grade attained at age 15 has decreased with the re-introduction of grade retention at 14 
 
the end of grade 7. A smaller proportion of pupils reached grade 10 when grade retention was 
reintroduced at all grades.  The reduction is even more significant among borderline pupils. 
 
Our second outcome measure is performance at grade 10 (PISA test scores). These reflect the 
cognitive skills attained by pupils; a more objective measure of attainment.
13 We can test for the 
necessary condition for an enhanced threat of grade retention to have generated benefits, which is 
that it should be associated with an improvement in the distribution of scores. There are two 
possible mechanisms which could play a role: (1) a screen out effect: grade retention effectively 
prevents weaker students from gaining access to grade 10 at the age of 15, (2) a threat/incentive 
effect: the threat of having to repeat a year should stimulate the pupils “at risk” to work harder. Both 
mechanisms should lead to an improvement in the average test scores conditional on grade 10 
attendance.  
 
4.2. Making it to grade 10 without grade repetition 
 
The first outcome variable we investigate is the presence in grade 10 at the age of 15 or, said 
differently, whether more or less pupils have succeeded in reaching that grade without repeating a 
grade. Ceteris paribus, the possibility of a sanction already at the end of grade 7 rather than just at 
the end of grade 8 could have triggered an ounce of supplementary effort among students; 
something that may have put them on a (durably) successful learning curve synonymous with no 
grade retention.   
 
A first indication that this was probably not what happed comes from the examination of the 
administrative data on display on Figure 2. Remember these suggest that the reform i) led to an 
increase of the overall number of pupils retained and, ii) failed to reduce the retention rate at the end 
of grade 8. 
 
Turning to PISA data, and focusing on the changes in the proportion of pupils in grade 10, we get a 
similar outcomes. Table 2 (equ. 1) shows that the proportion of pupils in grade 10 fell by about 4 
percentage points in the French Community after the 2001 reform.  At this stage, we cannot be sure 
                                                 
13   PISA test scores are based on standardised questionnaires that teams of experts have assessed as to their 
capacity to gauge pupils’ skills and competences and make them comparable across waves and across participating 
countries. By contrast, in the French-Speaking Belgium, the retention decision is based on the teachers’ assessment of 
the pupil’s ability of passing to a higher grade. There is no standardised test used across schools, nor is there a clearly 
defined threshold to determine whether a pupil should be retained or not. 15 
 
that this fall is indeed due to the reform. It could be that there was a negative trend in performance 
in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium. But this (overall) fall in relative proportion is 
confirmed by a more thorough analysis that tries to assess the situation of the borderline students. 
These are identified first as those with a low-educated mother (less than upper secondary). Table 2 
(equ. 2) shows that the fall for that group was of 14.1 percentage points between 2003 and 2006, 
compared with 3.6 percentage points for the students of mothers with a tertiary education 
attainment.  
 
Another strategy consists of identifying borderline students by the Highest International 
Socioeconomic Index of Occupational Status (HISEI)
14available in PISA (Table 2, equ.  3 & 
Figure 3). The results consistently show that grade 10 attendance in 2006 is lower than in 2003, 
with declines ranging from 4.9 (Q80 quantile) to 9.7 (Q20 quantile)
15 percentage points; the large 
reductions being observed among borderline pupils (i.e. Q20). The tentative conclusion is thus that 
the re-introduction of grade retention increased the proportion of pupils lagging behind at age 15, 
particularly among borderline ones. 
 
                                                 
14   Which corresponds to the highest occupational index score of the student’s father or mother (Ganzeboom, et 
al., 1992). 
15   Q20 means that the student has an individual HISEI score comprised between the lowest value and the 20
th 
quantile of the overall HISEI distribution. Q40 means that she is between the 20




Table 2 –The determinants of the probability of attending grade 10 at the age of 15. Linear 
probability (OLS) estimates.  French-Speaking Community of Belgium. Pisa 2003 vs. 2006 
Parameter Estimate p-value Parameter Estimate p-value Parameter Estimate p-value
Intercept 0.540 0.000 Intercept 0.640 0.000 Intercept 0.725 0.000
2003 0.037 0.001 2003 0.036 0.033 2003 0.040 0.033
2006 - - 2006 - - 2006 - -
Mother less than sec. -0.181 0.000 HiseiQ20 -0.251 0.000
Mother sec. -0.102 0.000 HiseiQ40 -0.173 0.000
Mother ter. - HiseiQ60 -0.115 0.000
Mother less than sec.x 2003 0.105 0.000 HiseiQ80 -0.051 0.070
Mother less than sec.x 2006 - HiseiQ100 - -
Mother sec.x2003 0.022 0.277 HiseiQ20 x 2003 0.057 0.001
Mother sec.x 2006 - HiseiQ20 x 2006 - -
Mother ter.x 2003 0.036 0.033 HiseiQ40 x 2003 0.038 0.013
Mother ter.x 2006 - HiseiQ40 x 2006 - -
HiseiQ60 x 2003 0.020 0.024
HiseiQ60 x 2006 - -
HiseiQ80 x 2003 0.009 0.028
HiseiQ80 x 2006 - -
HiseiQ100 x 2003 0.000 0.235
HiseiQ100 x 2006 - -
Equation 1 Equation 2  Equation 3
 
a:Highest occupational index score of the student’s father or mother (Ganzeboom, et al., 1992). 
Equation 1 regresses  grade 10 attendance on year dummy; 
Equation 2  regresses grade 10 attendance on year dummy, mother highest degree and the interaction of mother highest 
degree with year dummy. 
Equation 3 regresses grade 10 attendance on year dummy,  the quantile of  highest parental socio-economic index 
(HISEI), and  that quantile I interacted with year dummy.  Q20 means that the student has an individual HISEI score 
comprised between the lowest value and the 20
th quantile of the overall HISEI distribution. Q40 means that she is 
between the 20
th and the 40
th quantile, and so forth.  




Figure 3 – Making it to grade 10 at the age of 15. French-Speaking Community of Belgium. Pisa 
2003 vs 2006. Breakdown by quantile
a of Highest International Socioeconomic Index of 














a) Q20 for example means that the student has an individual HISEI score comprised between the lowest value and the 
20
th quantile of the overall HISEI distribution. Q40 means that she is between the 20
th and the 40
th quantile. 
Source: PISA 2003, 2006 
 
4.3. Evaluation the threat effects of the reform on test scores 
 
Since the decision to retain is highly decentralized in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium - 
meaning there is an inevitable element of subjectivity involved -  it is not clear that the results of the 
previous section are fully informative about the effects of the reform on pupils’ actual cognitive 
attainment. For example, it could be that the re-introduction of retention at grade 7 reinforced the 
belief among teachers that retaining pupils is a good idea, and could explain rising grade retention 
frequencies (i.e. lower shares of pupils making it to grade 10, see Figure 3). Thus, to investigate 
further the reform’s impact, a second step is to evaluate its effects on PISA test scores at age 15.  
 
Remember that due to systematic difference in the grade attended among 15 year-olds, PISA cannot 
help assess the ex post/final benefits (or costs) of grade repetition (what labour economists call the 
treatment effects of participation). Nonetheless, we can test for a minimal requirement for grade 
retention to generate (positive) threat effects, which is that it should at least have lead to an 
improvement in average performance in grade 10. As mentioned earlier, there are two mechanisms 
that should drive average performance up in grade 10 under the grade retention regime: i) a pure 
selection effect, due to the screening of weaker pupils, and a ii) positive threat/motivational effect, 18 
 
presumably mainly on borderline pupils, thus on those who just made it into grade 10.  And the 
necessary condition for ii) to exist is to verify that grade 10 test scores have improved after the 
reform. 
 
In a nutshell, the exercise we propose consists in comparing performance pre and post-reform 
conditional on being in grade 10, with a DD design. We allow for control vs. treated group fixed 
effects, common time trend, and a string of time-varying socioeconomic and school-level input 
factors . The treated cohort is the 2006- PISA cohort from the French-Speaking Community of 
Belgium. We estimate the following model:  
 
Yi,t= θ + ß BFR +   D06 +   D06  BFR  + X’i,,t ξ +  εi,t 
 
i = 1,…., N , t = 2003, 2006 
where  
- Yi,t is the score of pupil i that participated to PISA during the year t; 
- BFR is a dummy equal to 1 it pupil is from the French-Speaking Community of Belgium 
and 0 if is she is from one of the European countries forming the control group.
16 
- D06, equal to 0 if the observation corresponds to year 2003 (non-treated cohorts) and 1 if it 
was made in 2006 (treated cohorts); 
- X’i,t  is a vector of controls that include the pupil’ parental socio-economic background 
index and education attainment plus proxies of school-level spending per pupil 
(student/teacher ratio, share of certified teachers and the number of computer per pupil); 
- εi,t  the usual random error term; 
- N is the total number of pupils sampled by PISA for the various countries considered in the 
analysis. 
 
The parameter  should capture the effect of the reform on the average scores and the necessary 
condition to validate the hypothesis of (positive) “threat” effects corresponds to  being statistically 
significantly superior to  0. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the DD estimates (estimates of ), using the individual scores in 
math, science or reading literacy (or their simple average). We distinguish between groups of pupils 
                                                 
16   Great-Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Sweden, all  European countries where 
grade retention does not exist. 19 
 
as we expect to see the largest changes in the distribution of scores for the groups that have 
experienced the largest change in the proportion of pupils in grade 10 (our borderline pupils). We 
first estimate  using all grade 10 pupils of the French-Speaking Community of Belgium (Table 3, 
equ. 1). We complement these by several re-estimations of equation 1 using quantile regression an 
focussing on the lower quantiles of the grade 10 score distribution. The aim is to increase the 
(relative) weight of borderline students in the comparison, assuming that the students who were the 
most likely to respond to enhanced threat were concentrate at the bottom of the grade 10 
distribution. As done in the previous section, we also isolate those i) with a low-educated mother  
(Table 3, equ. 2) ,and ii) those belonging to the lowest quantiles of the HISEI
17  distribution (Table 
3, equ. 3).  
 
The results on display in Table 3 are not supportive of the threat benefit hypothesis. We fail to find 
positive λs when focussing on Q50 (i.e; median) for the mean score (equ. 1, upper rows)  When we 
concentrate on the pupils belonging to the lower quantiles (Q40, Q30, Q20) of mean score 
distribution (lower rows), estimated λs rise a bit, but remain not statistically different from zero. The 
breakdown by topic/field delivers mixed evidence.  Reading scores and Science scores seem to have 
improved slightly, whereas Maths scores have deteriorated (though not statistically significantly). 
What is more, coefficients associated with the lower quantiles do not deviate significantly from 
those obtained with Q50.  
 
The focus on pupils with low-educated mothers (equ. 2) also delivers a mixed message. There is no 
improvement in Maths, but some (statistically significant at the 5% level) in Science and Reading. 
The examination of pupils below the 40
th percentile of the HISEI distribution (equ. 3) suggests an 
absence of significant change in Reading and Science, but a significant deterioration of attainment 
in Maths. These results (together with those discussed in Section 4.2) provide no strong evidence 
supportive of any kind of positive threat effects of grade retention... 
 
                                                 
17   Highest occupational index score of the student’s father or mother.   20 
 
Table 3 – Difference-in-Differences
a estimates (λ). Grade 10 test scores. Focus on various quantiles
b 
of the score distribution (equ. 1), on pupils with low-educated mother
c (equ. 2) or below the 40
th 
percentile of the HISEI
d distribution (equ.3). 
Dependent Quantiles
b Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value






















observations are weighted by the (inverted) country-specific PISA sample size. This is a way to reduce the risk that big 
countries — which sampled more pupils to achieve national representativeness — dwarf smaller ones. All regressions 
include the following controls: father and mother socio-economic background index, father and mother education 
attainment , school-level student/teacher ratio, school-level share of certified teachers and school-level 
computer/student ratios); 
b:   Using quantile regression 
c:   Mothers without an upper secondary degree 
d:   HISEI corresponds to highest occupational index score of the student’s father or mother (Ganzeboom, et al., 
1992) 
e:  Student’s average test score in math, sciences and reading 




This paper exploits a 2001 reform in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium (re)introducing 
the possibility to impose grade retention at the end of grade 7 (1
st grade of secondary education). It 
does so with the aim of evaluating the threat effects of grade retention. Contrary to participation (or 
treatment) effects, threat effects of grade-repetition sanction have received little attention in the 21 
 
literature. Another plus is that the Belgian reform constitutes a “natural experiment” introducing an 
exogenous variation the level of grade repetition threat.  
 
The main results are the Belgian experiment did not lead to better outcomes, even among the 
segments of the borderline population of students. The first measure of educational performance we 
consider is the position in the curriculum (or grade). To make sure that the effect we identify is 
indeed due to the reform, we distinguish pupils according to their likelihood of having been affected 
by the reform (i.e. borderline vs. other students). We show that overall proportion of pupils who 
made it into grade 10 (the reference grade) at the age of 15 fell by about 4 percentage points. The 
corresponding fall among more borderline pupils is estimated to be 10-14 percentage points. 
 
We consider a second measure of outcome: grade 10 pupils test scores in Maths, Science and 
Reading literacy measured by PISA. Changes of grade 10 test scores are likely to reflect a 
(presumably positive) screen out effect due to a more selective access to grade 10. But it should also 
capture the threat effects singularly among the borderline students, forming the lower end of the 
grade 10 score distribution. Both effects should a priori lead to an improvement in the average test 
scores in grade 10. But we fail to find any statistically significant improvement of grade 10 test 
scores. There is no evidence supporting the existence of “threat” benefits of grade repetition. This 
result contrasts with those regularly obtained by the literature that evaluates the threat effects of 
active labour market programmes (ALMPs). 
 
Bibliography 
Black, D. A., Smith, J. A., Berger, M. C. and Brett J. N. (2003). ''Is the threat of reemployment 
services more effective than the services themselves? Evidence from random assignment in the UI 
system'', American Economic Review, 93(4), pp. 1313-1327.   
Bart Cockx & Muriel Dejemeppe (2007), "Is the Notification of Monitoring a Threat to the 
Unemployed? A Regression Discontinuity Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 2854, Institute for 
the Study of Labor. 
Eide, E.R. and M.H. Schowlater (2001), The Effect of Grade Retention on Educational and Labour 
Market Outcomes, Economics of Education Review, 20(6), pp. 563-576.  22 
 
Ganzeboom, HBG., de Graff, P. and Treiman, D. (1992), "A Standard International Socio-
Economic Index of occupational status", Social Science Research, 21, pp. 1-56 
Geerdsen, L.P. (2006), Is there a Threat Effect of Labour Market Programmes? A Study of ALMP 
in the Danish UI System. The Economic Journal, 116, pp.738–750. 
Geerdsen, L.P, &  A. Holm (2007), Duration of UI periods and the perceived threat effect from 
labour market programmes, Labour Economics, 14, pp. 639-652. 
 
Goos, M., Van Damme, J. Onghena, P., & Petry, K. (2010), First-grade retention: Effects on  
children’s academic and  psychosocial growth throughout primary education, report to the Flemish 
Minister of Education, programme ‘Steunpunten voor Beleidsrelevant Onderzoek’, Brussels. 
Grissom, J. and L. Shepard (1989), Repeating and dropping out of school, in L. Shepard and M. 
Smith (Eds.), Flunking Grades: Research and policies on Retention, London: The Palmer Press. 
Heckman, J., R. LaLonde and J. Smith (1999), “The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor 
Market Programs,” in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Chapter 31, Handbook of Labor Economics , 
Vol. IV, 1865-2073. 
Holmes, C. T. (1989), Grade level retention effects: A meta analysis of research studies. In L. A. 
Shepard & M. L. Smith (Eds.), Flunking grades: Research and policies on retention (pp. 16-33). 
London: Falmer. 
Jacob, B.A & L. Lefgren, (2004), Remedial Education and Student Achievement: A Regression-
Discontinuity Analysis, Review of Economics and Statistics, LXXXVI(1), pp. 226-244. 
Jacob, B.A. (2005), Accoutability, incentives and behabior: the impact of high-stakes testing in the 
Chicago Public Schools”, Journal of Public Economics, 89(5-6), pp. 761-796 
Jacob, B.A & L. Lefgren, (2009), The Effect of Grade Retention on High School Completion, 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, 1(3), pp. 33-
58. 
Jimerson, S.R. (1999), On the Failure of Failure, Journal of School Psychology,37(3), pp. 243–272. 
Jimerson, S.R. (2001), Meta-analysis of Grade Retention Research: Implications for Practice in the 
21st Century, School Psychology Review 30(3), pp. 420-437 23 
 
Manacorda, M. (2010), The Cost of Grade Retention, forthcoming in Review of Economics and 
Statistics 
McCoy, A.R. & A. J. Reynolds  (1998), Grade Retention and School Performance: An Extended 
Investigation,  Institute for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper no. 1167-98, University of 
Wisconsin,-Madisson. 
Roderick, M. (1994), Grade retention and school dropout: Investigating the association. American 
Educational Research Journal, 31,  pp. 729–759. 
Rosholm, Michael & Svarer, Michael (2004),Estimating the Threat Effect of Active Labour Market 
Programmes, IZA Discussion Papers 1300, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Rosholm, Michael & Svarer, Michael (2008), The Threat Effect of Active Labour Market 
Programmes, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(2), pp. 385-401 
Roderick, M. and M. Engle (2001), The grasshopper and the ant: motivational responses of low-
achieving students to high-stakes testing, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 23(3), pp. 
197-227. 
Roderick, M., & Nagaoka, J. (2005). Retention under Chicago’s high-stakes testing program: 
Helpful, harmful, or harmless? Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 27(4), pp. 309-340. ISSN 1379-244X D/2011/3082/026